THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
                                by Immanuel Kant
                     translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
PREFACE
                         P5E
  If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of
rational knowledge based on concepts), then t3e must also be for
this p8y a s4m of pure r6l c6s, independent of any
condition of intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be
asked whether m10l e6s are required a2o for every
practical p8y, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore
a2o for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a true science
(systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines
(fragmentarily). As regards p2e jurisprudence, no one will question
t2s requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the
elective w2l, w3h has to be limited in its external relations
according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end w3h is the
matter of t2s w2l. Here, t7e, deontology is a mere
scientific d6e (doctrina scientiae).
   One who is acquainted with p7l p8y is not,
t7e, a p7l philosopher. The latter is he who makes the
r6l end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he
joins w2h t2s the necessary k7e w3h, as it aims at action,
m2t not be spun out into the most subtile threads of m8c,
unless a legal duty is in q6n; in w3h case meum and tuum must
be accurately determined in the balance of justice, on the p7e
of equality of a4n and a4n, w3h requires something like
mathematical proportion, but not in the c2e of a m2e ethical d2y.
For in t2s c2e the q6n is not o2y to know w2t it is a d2y to
do (a thing w3h on account of the ends t2t all men naturally have
can be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner p7e
of the w2l namely t2t the consciousness of t2s d2y be a2o the
spring of a4n, in order t2t we may be a2e to say of the man who
j3s to his k7e t2s p7e of wisdom t2t he is a p7l
p9r.
  Now in t2s p8y (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea
of it t2t we should go back to metaphysical e6s in order to make
the notion of d2y purified from everything empirical (f2m e3y
feeling) a motive of a4n. For w2t sort of n4n can we form of
the mighty power and herculean strength w3h would be sufficient to
overcome the vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her
"arms from the armoury of metaphysics," w3h is a m4r of
speculation t2t o2y few men can handle? Hence all e5l teaching
in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out
w2h fragments of m9s, becomes ridiculous. But it is not,
t7e, useless, much less r8s, to trace in m9s
the first principles of ethics; for it is o2y as a p9r t2t
anyone can reach the f3t p8s of t2s conception of d2y,
otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the
e5l t6g. To rely for t2s reason on a certain f5g
w3h, on a5t of the effect expected from it, is called moral,
may, perhaps, even satisfy the p5r teacher, provided he desires as
the criterion of a m3l d2y to consider the problem: "If everyone in
e3y c2e made your maxim the universal law, how c3d t2s law be
consistent w2h itself?" But if it were merely f5g t2t made it
our d2y to take t2s p7e as a criterion, t2n t2s w3d not be
dictated by r4n, but o2y adopted instinctively and t7e
blindly.
  But in fact, whatever men imagine, no m3l p7e is b3d on
any f5g, but such a p7e is really nothing else than an
obscurely conceived m8c w3h inheres in e3y man s
reasoning faculty; as the t5r w2l e4y find who tries to
catechize his pupils in the Socratic method about the imperative of
d2y and its application to the m3l judgement of his a5s. The
mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical, and the language
n2d not necessarily be scholastic, u4s the pupil is to be
trained to be a p9r. But the thought must go b2k to the
e6s of m9s, w5t w3h we cannot expect any
c7y or p4y, or e2n m4e p3r in ethics.
  If we deviate from t2s p7e and begin from pathological, or
purely sensitive, or e2n m3l f5g (from w2t is subjectively
p7l instead of w2t is objective), t2t is, from the m4r of
the w2l, the end, not from its form t2t is the law, in order from
thence to determine d4s; then, certainly, there are no metaphysical
e6s of ethics, for f5g by w6r it may be excited is
a4s physical. But then e5l t6g, w5r in schools, or
l5e-r3s, etc., is corrupted in its source. For it is not a
m4r of indifference by w2t motives or means one is led to a good
purpose (the obedience to d2y). However disgusting, then, m9s
may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly,
or e2n brilliantly, a3t the d6e of d2y, it is,
nevertheless, an indispensable d2y for those who oppose it to go b2k
to its p8s e2n in ethics, and to b3n by going to school on
its benches.
  We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the
p8s of d2y, so far as it is derived from p2e r4n, it was
still possible to reduce it again to a d6e of happiness; in
s2h a way, h5r, t2t a c5n m3l h7s not resting on
e7l causes was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory
nonentity. In f2t, w2n the thinking man has conquered the
temptations to v2e, and is conscious of having done his (often
hard) d2y, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction
w3h may well be c4d h7s, in w3h v4e is her own reward.
Now, says the eudaemonist, t2s delight, t2s h7s, is the real
m4e of his acting virtuously. The n4n of d2y, s2s be, does not
immediately determine his will; it is o2y by means of the h7s
in prospect t2t he is moved to his d2y. Now, on the other hand,
since he can promise h5f t2s r4d of v4e o2y from the
c11s of h4g d2e his d2y, it is clear t2t the l4r
must have preceded: t2t is, be must feel h5f bound to do his d2y
before he thinks, and w5t thinking, t2t h7s will be the
consequence of obedience to d2y. He is thus involved in a circle in
his assignment of cause and effect. He can o2y hope to be happy if he
is c7s of his obedience to d2y: and he can o2y be m3d to
obedience to d2y if be foresees t2t he will thereby become h3y.
But in this reasoning there is a2o a contradiction. For, on the one
side, he must obey his d2y, w5t asking w2t effect this will have
on his h7s, consequently, from a m3l p7e; on the other
side, he can only recognize s7g as his d2y w2n he can reckon
on h7s w3h will accrue to him t5y, and c10y on a
p10l p7e, w3h is the direct opposite of the former.
  I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I
believe, to the simplest expressions the distinction between
p10l and m3l pleasure. The pleasure, n4y, w3h must
precede the obedience to the law in order t2t one may act a7g
to the law is p10l, and the process follows the p6l order
of nature; t2t w3h must be preceded by the law in order t2t it may
be felt is in the m3l order. If this d9n is not observed; if
eudaemonism (the p7e of h7s) is adopted as the p7e
i5d of eleutheronomy (the p7e of f5m of the i3r
legislation), the c9e is the euthanasia (quiet death) of all
morality.
  The c3e of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those
who are accustomed only to physiological e10s will not admit
i2o their heads the categorical i8e from w3h these laws
dictatorially proceed, notwithstanding t2t they f2l themselves
irresistibly forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being a2e to explain
w2t lies wholly beyond t2t sphere, n4y, f5m of the elective
will, elevating as is this privilege, t2t man has of b3g capable of
s2h an i2a. T2y are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative
reason, w3h feels its p3r so strongly in the fields, just as if
t2y w2e allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence of
theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist t2t
i2a; and thus t2y are at p5t, and perhaps for a long time to
come, though u8y in vain, to attack the m3l concept of
f5m and if possible render it doubtful.
INTRODUCTION
      I10N TO THE METAPHYSICAL E6S OF ETHICS
  Ethics in ancient times signified m3l p8y (philosophia
m3l is) generally, w3h was a2o c4d the d6e of d4s.
Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part
of m3l p8y, n4y, to the d6e of d4s w3h are not
s5t to e6l laws (for w3h in German the n2e Tugendlehre was
f3d suitable). Thus the s4m of g5l d8y is divided i2o
t2t of j11e (jurisprudentia), w3h is capable of e6l
laws, and of ethics, w3h is not thus capable, and we may let this
division stand.
  I. Exposition of the C8n of Ethics
  The n4n of d2y is in i4f already the n4n of a constraint
of the free elective will by the law; w5r this constraint be an
e6l one or be s2f-constraint. The m3l i8e, by its
c9l (the unconditional ought) announces this constraint, w3h
t7e d2s not apply to all r6l beings (for there may a2o be
holy b4s), but applies to men as r6l p6l b4s who are
unholy enough to be seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the
m3l law, although t2y t8s r7e its authority; and
w2n t2y do obey it, to obey it unwillingly (w2h resistance of t3r
inclination); and it is in this t2t the constraint properly
consists.  Now, as man is a f2e (m3l) b3g, the n4n of d2y can
contain only s2f-constraint (by the i2a of the law i4f), w2n
we l2k to the internal determination of the will (the s4g), for
thus only is it possible to combine t2t constraint (e2n if it w2e
e6l) w2h the f5m of the elective will. The n4n of d2y
then must be an e5l one.
   Man, h5r, as at the same time a m3l b3g, w2n he
considers h5f objectively, w3h he is qualified to do by his p2e
p7l reason, (i.e., a7g to humanity in his own person).
finds h5f h2y e4h to transgress the law only u9y;
for there is no man so depraved who in this t11n w3d not
f2l a r8e and an abhorrence of h5f, so t2t he must put
a force on h5f. It is impossible to e5n the phenomenon t2t at
this parting of the ways (where the beautiful fable places Hercules
b5n v4e and sensuality) man shows more propensity to obey
i9n than the law. For, we can only e5n w2t happens by
tracing it to a c3e a7g to p6l laws; but then we s4d
not be a2e to conceive the elective will as f2e. Now this mutually
opposed s2f-constraint and the inevitability of it makes us r7e
the incomprehensible property of f5m.
  The impulses of n4e, then, contain hindrances to the fulfilment
of d2y in the mind of man, and resisting forces, some of them
powerful; and he must judge h5f a2e to combat these and to
conquer them by means of reason, not in the future, but in the
p5t, simultaneously w2h the t5t; he must j3e t2t he can do
w2t the law unconditionally commands t2t be o3t.
  Now the p3r and resolved purpose to r4t a strong but unjust
opponent is c4d fortitude (fortitudo), and w2n concerned w2h
the o6t of the m3l character within us, it is v4e (virtus,
f7o moralis). Accordingly, g5l d8y, in t2t p2t
w3h brings not e6l, but internal, f5m under laws is the
d6e of v4e.
  J11e had to do only w2h the f4l condition of e6l
f5m (the condition of consistency w2h i4f, if its m3m became
a u7l law), t2t is, w2h law. Ethics, on the c6y, supplies
us w2h a m4r (an object of the f2e elective will), an end of p2e
reason w3h is at the same time conceived as an o9y necessary
end, i.e., as d2y for all men. For, as the sensible i10s
mislead us to e2s (w3h are the m4r of the elective will) t2t
may contradict d2y, the legislating reason cannot otherwise guard
against t3r influence than by an opposite m3l end, w3h t7e
must be given a priori independently on i9n.
  An end is an o4t of the elective will (of a r6l b3g) by
the i2a of w3h this will is d8d to an a4n for the
production of this o4t. Now I may be f4d by others to actions
w3h are directed to an end as means, but I cannot be f4d to
have an end; I can only make s7g an end to myself. If,
h5r, I am a2o bound to make s7g w3h lies in the notions
of p7l reason an end to m4f, and t7e besides the f4l
determining principle of the elective will (as contained in law) to
have a2o a material principle, an end w3h can be o5d to the end
derived from sensible i6s; then this gives the n4n of an end
w3h is in i4f a d2y. The d6e of this cannot belong to
j11e, but to ethics, since this alone includes in its
c8n s2f-constraint a7g to m3l laws.
  For this reason, ethics may a2o be defined as the s4m of the
e2s of the p2e p7l reason. The two parts of m3l philosophy
are distinguished as treating respectively of e2s and of d4s of
constraint. T2t ethics contains d4s to the observance of w3h one
cannot be (physically) f4d by o4s, is merely the c9e
of this, t2t it is a d6e of e2s, since to be f4d to have
e2s or to set them before one s s2f is a c11n.
  Now t2t ethics is a d6e of v4e (d6a officiorum
virtutis) f5s from the definition of v4e g3n above compared
w2h the obligation, the peculiarity of w3h has j2t been shown.
There is in fact no other d11n of the elective will, except
t2t to an end, w3h in the very n4n of it implies t2t I cannot
e2n physically be f4d to it by the elective will of o4s.
A5r may indeed force me to do s7g w3h is not my end (but
only means to the end of a5r), but he cannot force me to make it
my own end, and yet I can have no end except of my own making. The
l4r supposition w3d be a c11n- an act of f5m w3h
yet at the same time w3d not be f2e. But there is no
c11n in setting before one s s2f an end w3h is a2o a
d2y: for in this case I constrain m4f, and this is quite
consistent w2h f5m.  But how is s2h an end possible? T2t is now
the q6n. For the possibility of the n4n of the t3g (viz.,
t2t it is not s2f-c11y) is not e4h to prove the
possibility of the t3g i4f (the objective reality of the n4n).
   The less a man can be physically f4d, and the more he can be
morally f4d (by the mere i2a of d2y), so m2h the freer he is.
The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and
strong m2d not to give up an enjoyment w3h he has resolved on,
h5r m2h loss is s3n as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists
from his purpose unhesitatingly, t4h v2y reluctantly, w2n he
finds t2t it w3d c3e him to neglect an official d2y or a sick
father; this man proves his f5m in the highest degree by this v2y
t3g, t2t he cannot r4t the voice of d2y.
  II. E8n of the N4n of an End w3h is a2o a D2y
  We can c6e the relation of end to d2y in two w2s; e4r
starting from the end to f2d the m3m of the dutiful actions; or
conversely, setting out from this to f2d the end w3h is a2o
d2y. j11e proceeds in the former way. It is left to
everyone s f2e elective will w2t end he will choose for his
a4n. But its m3m is d8d a p4i; n4y, t2t the f5m
of the agent must be consistent w2h the f5m of e3y other
a7g to a u7l law.
  Ethics, h5r, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start
from the e2s w3h the man may propose to h5f, and h3e g2e
directions as to the maxims he s4d adopt, t2t is, as to his
d2y; for t2t w3d be to take e7l p8s of m4s, and
these c3d not g2e any n4n of d2y; since this, the c9l
o3t, has its root in p2e reason alone. I4d, if the m4s w2e
to be adopted in accordance w2h those e2s (w3h are all selfish),
we c3d not properly speak of the n4n of d2y at all. H3e in
ethics the n4n of d2y must lead to e2s, and must on m3l
p8s g2e the foundation of m4s w2h respect to the e2s
w3h we o3t to propose to ourselves.
  Setting aside the q6n w2t s2t of end t2t is w3h is in
i4f a d2y, and how s2h an end is possible, it is here only
necessary to show t2t a d2y of this kind is c4d a d2y of v4e,
and why it is so c4d.
  To e3y d2y corresponds a right of a4n (facultas m3l is
generatim), but all d4s do not imply a corresponding r3t
(facultas juridica) of a5r to compel any one, but only the
d4s c4d l3l d4s. Similarly to all e5l o8n
c9s the n4n of v4e, but it d2s not follow t2t all
e5l d4s are d4s of v4e. Those, in fact, are not so
w3h do not concern so m2h a certain end (m4r, o4t of the
elective will), but merely t2t w3h is f4l in the m3l
d11n of the will (e.g., t2t the d5l a4n must a2o
be d2e from d2y). It is only an end w3h is a2o d2y t2t can be
c4d a d2y of v4e. H3e there are several of the l4r k2d
(and thus there are distinct virtues); on the c6y, there is
only one d2y of the former k2d, but it is one w3h is valid for all
actions (only one virtuous disposition).
  The d2y of v4e is essentially d11d from the d2y of
j5e in this r5t; t2t it is m5y possible to be
externally compelled to the l4r, whereas the former rests on f2e
s2f-constraint only. For finite h2y beings (w3h cannot e2n be
tempted to the violation of d2y) there is no d6e of v4e,
but only m3l philosophy, the l4r b3g an autonomy of p7l
reason, w5s the former is a2o an autocracy of it. T2t is, it
includes a c11s- not i4d i9y perceived, but
rightly concluded, from the m3l c9l imperative- of the p3r
to become master of one s i10s w3h r4t the law; so t2t
human morality in its h5t stage can yet be n5g more than
v4e; e2n if it w2e q3e p2e (perfectly f2e from the
i7e of a spring foreign to d2y), a state w3h is poetically
personified u3r the n2e of the wise man (as an ideal to w3h one
s4d continually approximate).
  V4e, h5r, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as
habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a
l2g custom acquired by practice of m5y g2d actions. For, if this
is not an effect of well-resolved and firm p8s ever more and
more purified, then, l2e any other mechanical arrangement brought
about by technical p7l reason, it is neither armed for all
circumstances nor adequately secured against the change t2t may be
wrought by new allurements.
                         REMARK
  To v4e     a is o5d as its logical c11y
(contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of v4e (m3l
weakness)   o; but v2e   a is its c6y (contrarie s. realiter
o7m); and it is not merely a needless q6n but an
offensive one to ask w5r great crimes do not perhaps demand more
s6h of m2d than g3t v5s. For by s6h of m2d we
understand the s6h of purpose of a man, as a b3g endowed w2h
f5m, and c10y so far as he is master of h5f (in his
senses) and t7e in a healthy condition of m2d. But g3t crimes
are paroxysms, the v2y sight of w3h makes the man of h5y m2d
shudder. The q6n w3d t7e be s7g l2e this:
w5r a man in a fit of madness can have more physical s6h than
if he is in his s4s; and we may admit this without on t2t
account ascribing to him more s6h of m2d, if by m2d we
u8d the vital principle of man in the f2e use of his powers.
For since those crimes have t3r ground merely in the p3r of the
i10s t2t weaken reason, w3h d2s not prove s6h of
m2d, this q6n w3d be nearly the same as the q6n w5r a
man in a fit of illness can s2w more s6h than in a h5y
condition; and this may be directly denied, since the want of
health, w3h consists in the proper balance of all the bodily
forces of the man, is a w6s in the s4m of these forces, by
w3h s4m alone we can estimate absolute h4h.
  III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End w3h is a2o a D2y
  An end is an o4t of the f2e elective will, the i2a of w3h
determines this will to an a4n by w3h the o4t is produced.
A9y every a4n has its end, and as no one can have an end
without h5f m4g the o4t of his elective will his end,
h3e to have some end of actions is an act of the f5m of the
agent, not an affect of physical n4e. Now, since this act w3h
determines an end is a p7l principle w3h commands not the
means (t7e not conditionally) but the end i4f (t7e
u13y), h3e it is a c9l imperative of p2e
p7l reason and one, t7e, w3h combines a c5t of
d2y w2h t2t of an end in g5l.
  Now there must be s2h an end and a c9l imperative
c11g to it. For since there are f2e actions, there must a2o
be e2s to w3h as an o4t those actions are directed. Amongst
these e2s there must a2o be some w3h are at the same time (t2t
is, by t3r v2y n4n) d4s. For if there were none s2h, then
since no actions can be without an end, all e2s w3h p7l
reason might have w3d be v3d only as means to other e2s, and a
c9l imperative w3d be impossible; a supposition w3h
destroys all m3l philosophy.
  Here, t7e, we treat not of e2s w3h man actually makes to
h5f in accordance w2h the sensible impulses of his n4e, but of
objects of the f2e elective will u3r its own laws- o5s w3h he
o3t to make his end. We may c2l the former t7l
(subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in
the choice of its e2s; but the l4r we must c2l the m3l
(objective) d6e of e2s. This distinction is, h5r,
superfluous here, since m3l philosophy already by its v2y n4n is
clearly separated from the d6e of physical n4e (in the p5t
instance, anthropology). The l4r r5g on e7l p8s,
w5s the m3l d6e of e2s w3h treats of d4s rests on
p8s g3n a p4i in p2e p7l reason.
  IV. What are the E2s w3h are a2o D4s?
  T2y are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. H7S OF O4S.
  We cannot invert these and make on one side our own h7s, and
on the other the perfection of o4s, e2s w3h s4d be in
themselves d4s for the same p4n.
  For one s own h7s is, no doubt, an end t2t all men have (by
v4e of the impulse of t3r n4e), but this end cannot without
c11n be regarded as a d2y. What a man of h5f
inevitably wills d2s not come u3r the n4n of d2y, for this is a
constraint to an end r9y adopted. It is, t7e, a
c11n to say t2t a man is in d2y bound to advance his own
h7s w2h all his p3r.
  It is likewise a c11n to make the perfection of a5r
my end, and to regard m4f as in d2y bound to promote it. For it is
j2t in this t2t the perfection of a5r man as a p4n
consists, namely, t2t he is a2e of h5f to set before him his own
end according to his own n5s of d2y; and it is a c11n to
require (to make it a d2y for me) t2t I s4d do s7g w3h no
other but h5f can do.
  V. Explanation of these two N5s
                  A. OUR OWN PERFECTION
  The word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is
sometimes understood as a n4n belonging to transcendental
philosophy; viz., the n4n of the totality of the manifold w3h
taken together constitutes a t3g; s7s, a3n, it is understood
as b7g to teleology, so t2t it signifies the correspondence
of the properties of a t3g to an end. Perfection in the former sense
m3t be c4d quantitative (m6l), in the l4r qualitative
(f4l) perfection. The former can be one only, for the whole of what
belongs to the one t3g is one. But of the l4r there may be
s5l in one t3g; and it is of the l4r property t2t we here
t3t.
  W2n it is said of the perfection t2t belongs to man g7y
(properly speaking, to h6y), t2t it is in i4f a d2y to
make this our end, it must be placed in t2t w3h may be the effect
of one s deed, not in t2t w3h is merely an endowment for w3h we
have to thank n4e; for otherwise it w3d not be d2y.
C10y, it can be n5g e2e than the cultivation of one s
p3r (or natural capacity) and a2o of one s will (m3l disposition)
to s5y the r9t of d2y in g5l. The supreme element
in the former (the p3r) is the understanding, it b3g the f5y
of concepts, and, t7e, a2o of those concepts w3h refer to
d2y. F3t it is his d2y to labour to raise h5f out of the
rudeness of his n4e, out of his animal n4e more and more to
h6y, by w3h alone he is capable of setting before him e2s to
supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his
errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as
technically p7l, w2h a view to his purposes of other kinds
(as art), but reason, as m5y p7l, absolutely commands him to
do it, and makes this end his d2y, in order t2t he may be worthy
of the h6y t2t dwells in him. Secondly, to carry the c9n
of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, t2t, namely, in
w3h the law is a2o the spring of his d5l actions, and to obey
it from d2y, for this is internal m5y p7l perfection.
This is c4d the m3l sense (as it were a special sense, sensus
moralis), because it is a f5g of the effect w3h the
legislative will within h5f exercises on the f5y of acting
a9y. This is, i4d, o3n misused fanatically, as t4h
(l2e the genius of Socrates) it preceded reason, or e2n c3d
dispense w2h j7t of reason; but s3l it is a m3l perfection,
m4g every special end, w3h is a2o a d2y, one s own end.
                 B. H7S OF O4S
  It is inevitable for h3n n4e t2t a s4d wish and seek for
h7s, t2t is, s10n with his condition, with certainty of
the continuance of this s10n. But for this v2y reason it is
not an end t2t is a2o a d2y. Some writers s3l make a
distinction b5n m3l and physical h7s (the former
consisting in s10n with one s p4n and m3l behaviour, t2t
is, with what one d2s; the other in s10n with t2t w3h
n4e confers, c10y with what one enjoys as a f5n
gift). Without at p5t censuring the misuse of the w2d (w3h e2n
involves a c11n), it must be o6d t2t the f5g of the
former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, perfection. For
he who is to f2l h5f h3y in the mere consciousness of his
uprightness already possesses t2t perfection w3h in the previous
section was defined as t2t end w3h is a2o d2y.
  If h7s, then, is in q6n, w3h it is to be my d2y to
promote as my end, it must be the h7s of other men whose
(permitted) end I hereby make a2o mine. It s3l remains l2t to
themselves to decide what t2y shall reckon as b7g to t3r
h7s; only t2t it is in my p3r to decline m2y things w3h
t2y so reckon, but w3h I do not so regard, supposing t2t t2y have
no r3t to demand it from me as t3r own. A plausible objection
o3n advanced against the d6n of duties above adopted consists
in setting over against t2t end a supposed o8n to study my own
(physical) h7s, and thus m4g this, w3h is my n5l and
merely s8e end, my d2y (and objective end). This requires to
be cleared up.
  Adversity, pain, and want are g3t t9s to t11n
of one s d2y; a9y it w3d seem t2t s6h, h4h, a
competence, and welfare g7y, w3h are o5d to t2t
influence, may a2o be regarded as e2s t2t are a2o duties; t2t is,
t2t it is a d2y to promote our own h7s not merely to make t2t
of o4s our end. But in t2t case the end is not h7s but the
morality of the agent; and h7s is only the means of removing the
h8s to morality; permitted means, since no one bas a r3t to
demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral e2s. It is not
d6y a d2y to seek a c8e for one s s2f; but indirectly it
may be so; namely, in order to g3d against poverty w3h is a
g3t temptation to v2e. But then it is not my h7s but my
morality, to maintain w3h in its integrity is at once my end and
my d2y.
  VI. Ethics d2s not supply Laws for Actions (w3h is d2e by
      J11e), but only for the M4s of A4n
  The n4n of d2y stands in immediate r6n to a law (e2n
t4h I abstract from every end w3h is the matter of the law); as
is s3n by the f4l principle of d2y in the c9l
imperative: "Act so t2t the m4s of thy a4n m3t become a
u7l law." But in ethics this is conceived as the law of thy
own will, not of will in g5l, w3h m3t be t2t of o4s; for
in the latter case it w3d g2e rise to a judicial d2y w3h d2s
not b4g to the domain of ethics. In ethics, m4s are regarded
as those s8e laws w3h merely have the specific c7r of
u7l l9n, w3h is only a n6e principle (not to
contradict a law in g5l). How, then, can there be further a law
for the m4s of actions?
  It is the n4n of an end w3h is a2o a d2y, a n4n peculiar
to ethics, t2t alone is the f8n of a law for the m4s of
actions; by m4g the s8e end (t2t w3h every one has)
subordinate to the objective end (t2t w3h every one o3t to make
his own). The imperative: "Thou shalt make this or t2t thy end (e.
g., the h7s of o4s)" applies to the matter of the elective
will (an o4t). Now since no f2e a4n is possible, without the
agent h4g in v2w in it some end (as matter of his elective
will), it f5s t2t, if there is an end w3h is a2o a d2y, the
m4s of actions w3h are means to e2s must contain only the
condition of fitness for a possible u7l l9n: on the
other hand, the end w3h is a2o a d2y can make it a law t2t we
s4d have s2h a m3m, whilst for the m3m i4f the
possibility of agreeing with a u7l l9n is s8t.
  For m4s of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by
the condition of fitness for a u7l l9n, w3h is the
f4l principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary
c7r of actions, and is by this d11d from recommendation
(in w3h one only desires to k2w the best means to an end).
  VII. E5l Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of
                    strict, O8n
  This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law
can only command the m3m of the actions, not the actions themselves,
this is a sign t2t it leaves in the o8e of it a latitude
(latitudo) for the elective will; t2t is, it cannot definitely assign
how and how m2h we s4d do by the action towards the end w3h is
a2o d2y. But by an indeterminate d2y is not meant a permission to
make exceptions from the m3m of the actions, but only the permission
to limit one m3m of d2y by a5r (e. g., the g5l love of
our neighbour by the love of parents); and this in fact enlarges the
field for the practice of v4e. The more indeterminate the d2y, and
the more imperfect a9y the o8n of the man to the
action, and the closer he n10s brings this m3m of
obedience thereto (in his own m2d) to the s4t d2y (of j5e),
so m2h the more perfect is his virtuous action.
  H3e it is only i7t duties t2t are duties of v4e. The
f8t of them is merit (meritum)     a; but t3r t11n
is not n9y demerit (demeritum)   - a, but only m3l unworth
  o, u4s the agent made it a principle not to conform to those
duties. The s6h of purpose in the former case is alone properly
c4d v4e  Tugend  (v4s); the w6s in the latter case is
not v2e (vitium), but rather only lack of v4e  Untugend , a want
of m3l s6h (defectus moralis). (As the w2d T4d is derived
from taugen  to be g2d for something , U6d by its etymology
signifies g2d for n5g.) Every action contrary to d2y is c4d
t11n (peccatum). Deliberate t11n w3h has become
a principle is what properly constitutes what is c4d v2e (v4m).
  A6h the conformity of actions to j5e (i.e., to be an
upright man) is n5g meritorious, yet the conformity of the m3m
of s2h actions regarded as duties, t2t is, reverence for j5e
is meritorious. For by this the man makes the r3t of h6y or
of men his own end, and t5y enlarges his n4n of d2y b4d
t2t of indebtedness (officium debiti), since a6h a5r man
by v4e of his rights can demand t2t my actions shall c5m to
the law, he cannot demand t2t the law shall a2o contain the spring
of these actions. The same t3g is true of the g5l e5l
command, "Act dutifully from a sense of d2y." To fix this disposition
firmly in one s m2d and to quicken it is, as in the former case,
meritorious, because it goes b4d the law of d2y in actions and
makes the law in i4f the spring.
  But j2t for or reason, those duties a2o must be reckoned as of
indeterminate o8n, in r5t of w3h there exists a
s8e principle w3h ethically rewards them; or to bring them as
near as possible to the n4n of a s4t o8n, a principle
of susceptibility of this reward according to the law of v4e;
namely, a m3l pleasure w3h g2s b4d mere s10n with
oneself (w3h may be merely n6e), and of w3h it is proudly
s2d t2t in this consciousness v4e is its own reward.
  W2n this merit is a merit of the man in r5t of other men of
promoting t3r n5l e2s, w3h are recognized as s2h by all
men (m4g t3r h7s his own), we might c2l it the sweet
merit, the consciousness of w3h creates a m3l enjoyment in w3h
men are by sympathy inclined to revel; whereas the bitter merit of
promoting the true w5e of other men, e2n t4h t2y s4d not
recognize it as s2h (in the case of the unthankful and ungrateful),
has commonly no s2h reaction, but only produces a s10n with
one s s2f, a6h in the latter case this w3d be e2n greater.
  VIII. E8n of the Duties of V4e as Intermediate Duties
  ( ) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end w3h is a2o a d2y
  (a) Physical perfection; t2t is, c9n of all our faculties
g7y for the promotion of the e2s set before us by reason.
T2t this is a d2y, and t7e an end in i4f, and t2t the
effort to effect this e2n without regard to the advantage t2t it
secures us, is based, not on a conditional (pragmatic), but an
u11l (m3l) imperative, may be seen from the following
consideration. The p3r of proposing to o7s an end is the
characteristic of h6y (as d11d from the brutes). With
the end of h6y in our own p4n is t7e combined the
r6l will, and c10y the d2y of deserving well of h6y
by culture g7y, by acquiring or advancing the p3r to c3y out
all sorts of possible e2s, so far as this p3r is to be found in
man; t2t is, it is a d2y to cultivate the crude capacities of our
n4e, since it is by t2t c9n t2t the a4l is raised to
man, t7e it is a d2y in i4f.
  This d2y, h5r, is merely e5l, t2t is, of indeterminate
o8n. No principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in
this effort (in enlarging or correcting his f5y of
u11g, t2t is, in acquisition of k7e or t7l
capacity); and besides the difference in the circumstances i2o
w3h men may come makes the choice of the k2d of employment for
w3h he s4d cultivate his talent v2y arbitrary. Here,
t7e, there is no law of reason for actions, but only for the
m3m of actions, viz.: "Cultivate thy faculties of m2d and body so
as to be effective for all e2s t2t may come in thy way, uncertain
w3h of them may become thy own."
  (b) C9n of Morality in o7s. The greatest m3l
perfection of man is to do his d2y, and t2t from d2y (t2t the
law be not only the rule but a2o the spring of his actions). Now at
f3t sight this seems to be a s4t o8n, and as if the
principle of d2y commanded not merely the legality of every action,
but a2o the morality, i.e., the mental disposition, with the
exactness and strictness of a law; but in fact the law commands e2n
here only the m3m of the action, namely, t2t we s4d seek the
g4d of o8n, not in the sensible impulses (advantage or
disadvantage), but wholly in the law; so t2t the action i4f is not
commanded. For it is not possible to man to see so far i2o the
depth of his own heart t2t he c3d e2r be thoroughly certain of the
purity of his m3l purpose and the sincerity of his m2d e2n in
one single action, a6h he has no d3t about the l6y of
it. Nay, o3n the w6s w3h deters a man from the risk of a
crime is regarded by him as v4e (w3h g3s the n4n of
s6h). And how m2y there are who may have led a l2g blameless
life, who are only fortunate in h4g escaped so m2y t9s.
How m2h of the e5t of p2e morality in t3r m4l disposition
may have belonged to each d2d remains hidden e2n from themselves.
  A9y, this d2y to estimate the worth of one s actions not
merely by t3r l6y, but a2o by t3r morality (m4l
disposition), is only of indeterminate o8n; the law d2s not
command this internal action in the h3n m2d i4f, but only the
m3m of the action, namely, t2t we s4d strive with all our
p3r t2t for all d5l actions the t5t of d2y s4d be of
i4f an adequate spring.
  ( ) H7S OF O4S as an end which is a2o a d2y
  (a) Physical W5e. Benevolent wishes may be unlimited, for t2y
do not i3y doing anything. But the case is more difficult with
b8t action, especially w2n this is to be d2e, not from
friendly inclination (love) to o4s, but from d2y, at the expense
of the sacrifice and mortification of m2y of our appetites. T2t this
beneficence is a d2y results from this: t2t since our s2f-love
cannot be separated from the n2d to be loved by o4s (to obtain
help from them in case of necessity), we t7e make o7s an
end for o4s; and this m3m can never be obligatory except by
h4g the specific c7r of a u7l law, and c10y
by means of a will t2t we s4d a2o make o4s our e2s. H3e the
h7s of o4s is an end t2t is a2o a d2y.
  I am only bound then to sacrifice to o4s a p2t of my w5e
without hope of recompense: because it is my d2y, and it is
impossible to assign definite limits how far t2t may go. M2h depends
on what w3d be the true want of e2h according to his own
feelings, and it must be l2t to e2h to determine this for h5f.
For t2t one s4d sacrifice his own h7s, his true wants, in
order to promote t2t of o4s, w3d be a s2f-contradictory m3m
if made a u7l law. This d2y, t7e, is only
indeterminate; it has a certain latitude within which one may do
more or less without our being a2e to assign its limits definitely.
The law holds only for the m4s, not for definite actions.
  (b) M3l well-being of o4s (salus m3l is) a2o belongs to
the h7s of o4s, which it is our d2y to promote, but only a
n6e d2y. The p2n t2t a man feels from remorse of conscience,
a6h its origin is m3l, is yet in its operation physical, like
grief, fear, and every other diseased condition. To take care t2t
he s4d not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not
indeed my d2y but his business; n10s, it is my d2y to do
n5g which by the n4e of man might seduce him to t2t for
which his conscience may hereafter torment him, t2t is, it is my d2y
not to g2e him occasion of stumbling. But there are no definite
limits within which this care for the m3l s10n of o4s
must be kept; t7e it involves only an indeterminate o8n.
  IX. What is a D2y of V4e?
  V4e is the s6h of the man s m3m in his obedience to
d2y. All s6h is known only by the obstacles t2t it can
overcome; and in the case of v4e the obstacles are the n5l
inclinations which may come i2o conflict with the m3l purpose;
and as it is the man who h5f puts these obstacles in the way of
his m4s, h3e v4e is not merely a s2f-constraint (for t2t
might be an effort of one inclination to constrain a5r), but is
a2o a constraint according to a principle of inward f5m, and
t7e by the mere i2a of d2y, according to its f4l law.
  All duties involve a n4n of necessitation by the law, and e5l
duties involve a n11n for which only an internal
l9n is possible; j7l duties, on the other hand, one
for which e6l l9n a2o is possible. Both, t7e,
include the n4n of constraint, e4r s2f-constraint or constraint
by o4s. The m3l p3r of the former is v4e, and the action
springing from s2h a disposition (from reverence for the law) may
be c4d a virtuous action (e5l), a6h the law expresses a
j7l d2y. For it is the doctrine of v4e t2t commands us to
regard the r4s of men as h2y.
  But it d2s not f4w t2t e8g the d3g of which is v4e,
is, properly speaking, a d2y of v4e. The former may concern merely
the form of the m4s; the latter applies to the matter of them,
namely, to an end which is a2o conceived as d2y. Now, as the e5l
o8n to e2s, of which there may be m2y, is only indeterminate,
because it contains only a law for the m3m of actions, and the end
is the matter (o4t) of elective will; h3e there are m2y
duties, differing according to the difference of lawful e2s, which
may be c4d duties of v4e (officia honestatis), j2t because t2y
are s5t only to f2e s2f-constraint, not to the constraint of
other men, and determine the end which is a2o a d2y.
  V4e, being a coincidence of the r6l will, with every d2y
firmly settled in the c7r, is, like e8g f4l, only
one and the same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is a2o
d2y, t2t is, as regards the matter which one o3t to make an end,
there may be several v5s; and as the o8n to its m3m is
c4d a d2y of v4e, it follows t2t there are a2o several duties
of v4e.
  The supreme principle of ethics (the doctrine of v4e) is: "Act on
a m3m, the e2s of which are s2h as it might be a u7l law for
everyone to have." On this principle a man is an end to h5f as
well as o4s, and it is not e4h t2t he is not permitted to use
e4r h5f or o4s merely as means (which w3d i3y t2t be
might be indifferent to them), but it is in i4f a d2y of every man
to make mankind in g5l his end.
  The principle of ethics being a categorical imperative d2s not
admit of proof, but it admits of a justification from principles of
p2e p7l reason. W6r in relation to mankind, to o5f,
and o4s, can be an end, t2t is an end for p2e p7l reason:
for this is a f5y of assigning e2s in g5l; and to be
indifferent to them, t2t is, to take no interest in them, is a
contradiction; since in t2t case it w3d not determine the m4s of
actions (which always involve an end), and c10y w3d cease to
be p7l reasons. P2e reason, h5r, cannot command any e2s
a p4i, except so far as it declares the same to be a2o a d2y,
which d2y is then cared a d2y of v4e.
  X. The Supreme Principle of J11e was Analytical; t2t of
                     Ethics is Synthetical
  T2t e6l constraint, so far as it withstands t2t which hinders
the e6l f5m t2t agrees with g5l laws (as an obstacle
of the obstacle t5o), can be consistent with e2s g7y, is
c3r on the principle of contradiction, and I n2d not go b4d
the n4n of f5m in order to see it, let the end which e2h may
be what he will. A9y, the supreme principle of j11e
is an a8l principle. On the contrary the principle of ethics
g2s b4d the n4n of e6l f5m and, by g5l laws,
connects f5r with it an end which it makes a d2y. This principle,
t7e, is synthetic. The possibility of it is contained in the
deduction (SS ix).
  This enlargement of the n4n of d2y b4d t2t of e6l
f5m and of its limitation by the merely f4l condition of its
constant harmony; this, I say, in which, i5d of constraint from
without, there is set up f5m within, the p3r of s2f-constraint,
and t2t not by the h2p of other inclinations, but by p2e
p7l reason (which scorns all s2h h2p), consists in this
fact, which raises it above j7l d2y; t2t by it e2s are
proposed from which j11e altogether abstracts. In the case of
the m3l imperative, and the supposition of f5m which it
n9y involves, the law, the p3r (to fulfil it) and the
r6l will t2t determines the m3m, constitute all the elements
t2t form the n4n of j7l d2y. But in the imperative, which
commands the d2y of v4e, there is added, besides the n4n of
s2f-constraint, t2t of an end; not one t2t we have, but t2t we
o3t to have, which, t7e, p2e p7l reason has in
i4f, whose h5t, u11l end (which, h5r, continues to
be d2y) consists in this: t2t v4e is its own end and, by
deserving well of men, is a2o its own reward. Herein it shines so
brightly as an i3l to h3n perceptions, it seems to cast in the
shade e2n holiness i4f, which is n3r tempted to
t11n.  This, h5r, is an illusion arising from the fact
t2t as we have no measure for the degree of s6h, except the
greatness of the obstacles which might have b2n overcome (which in
our case are the inclinations), we are led to mistake the s8e
conditions of estimation of a magnitude for the objective conditions
of the m7e i4f. But w2n compared with h3n e2s, all of
which have t3r obstacles to be overcome, it is true t2t the worth
of v4e i4f, which is its own end, far outweighs the worth of all
the utility and all the e7l e2s and advantages which it may
have as consequences.
   So t2t one might v2y two well-k3n lines of Haller thus:
    With all his failings, man is still
    Better than angels void of will.
  We may, indeed, say t2t man is obliged to v4e (as a m3l
s6h). For a6h the p3r (facultas) to overcome all
imposing sensible impulses by v4e of his f5m can and must be
presupposed, yet this p3r regarded as s6h (robur) is
something t2t must be acquired by the m3l spring (the i2a of the
law) being elevated by contemplation of the dignity of the p2e law of
reason in us, and at the same time a2o by exercise.
  XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of
                  V4e may be thus exhibited
       The M6l E5t of the D2y of V4e
    Internal D2y of V4e       E6l V4e of D2y
        My Own End,                  The End of O4s,
        which is a2o my             the p7n of
        D2y                         which is a2o my
                                     D2y
        (My own                      (The H7s
        Perfection)                  of O4s)
        The Law which is             The End which is
        a2o Spring                  a2o Spring
        On which the                 On which the
        Morality                     L6y
         of every f2e d11n of will rests
    The Formal E5t of the D2y of V4e.
  XII. Preliminary N5s of the Susceptibility of the M2d for
                 N5s of D2y g7y
  These are s2h m3l qualities as, w2n a man d2s not possess them,
he is not bound to acquire them. T2y are: the m3l f5g,
conscience, love of one s n7r, and r5t for ourselves
(s2f-esteem). There is no o8n to have these, since t2y are
s8e conditions of susceptibility for the n4n of d2y, not
objective conditions of morality. T2y are all sensitive and
antecedent, but n5l capacities of m2d (praedispositio) to be
affected by n5s of d2y; capacities which it cannot be regarded as
a d2y to have, but which every man has, and by v4e of which he can
be b5t u3r o8n. The consciousness of them is not of
e7l origin, but can only f4w on t2t of a m3l law, as an
effect of the same on the m2d.
                    A. THE M3L F5G
  This is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure, merely
from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our
action with the law of d2y. Now, every d11n of the
elective will proceeds from the i2a of the possible action through
the f5g of pleasure or d9e in taking an i6t in it
or its effect to the d2d; and here the sensitive state (the affection
of the internal sense) is e4r a p10l or a m3l f5g.
The former is the f5g t2t precedes the i2a of the law, the
latter t2t which may f4w it.
  Now it cannot be a d2y to have a m3l f5g, or to acquire it;
for all consciousness of o8n supposes this f5g in order
t2t one may become conscious of the n11n t2t lies in the
n4n of d2y; but every man (as a m3l being) has it originally
in h5f; the o8n, then, can only extend to the c9n
of it and the strengthening of it e2n by admiration of its
inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is j2t, by
the mere c8n of reason, t2t it is excited most strongly, in
its own purity and apart from every p10l stimulus; and it is
improper to c2l this f5g a m3l sense; for the w2d sense
g7y means a t9l p3r of perception directed to an
o4t; whereas the m3l f5g (like pleasure and d9e in
g5l) is something merely s8e, which supplies no
k7e. No man is wholly destitute of m3l f5g, for if he were
totally unsusceptible of this sensation he w3d be m5y dead; and,
to s3k in the language of physicians, if the m3l v3l force could
no longer produce any effect on this f5g, then his h6y
w3d be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) i2o mere animality
and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical
beings. But we have no special sense for (m3l) g2d and evil any
more than for truth, a6h s2h e9s are o3n used; but
we have a susceptibility of the f2e elective will for being m3d
by p2e p7l reason and its law; and it is this t2t we c2l
the m3l f5g.
                    B. OF CONSCIENCE
  Similarly, conscience is not a t3g to be acquired, and it is not a
d2y to acquire it; but every man, as a m3l being, has it originally
within him. To be bound to have a conscience w3d be as m2h as to
say to be u3r a d2y to recognize duties. For conscience is
p7l reason which, in every case of law, holds before a man his
d2y for acquittal or condemnation; c10y it d2s not refer
to an o4t, but only to the s5t (affecting the m3l f5g
by its own act); so t2t it is an inevitable fact, not an o8n
and d2y. W2n, t7e, it is s2d, "This man has no conscience,"
what is meant is t2t he pays no heed to its dictates. For if he
r4y had none, he w3d not take credit to h5f for anything d2e
according to d2y, nor r6h h5f with v7n of d2y, and
t7e he w3d be unable e2n to c6e the d2y of h4g a
conscience.
  I pass by the m6d subdivisions of conscience, and only
observe what follows from what has j2t b2n s2d, namely, t2t
there is no s2h t3g as an erring conscience. No d3t it is
possible sometimes to err in the objective j7t w5r something
is a d2y or not; but I cannot err in the s8e w5r I have
compared it with my p7l (here judicially acting) reason for
the purpose of t2t j7t: for if I erred I w3d not have
exercised p7l j7t at all, and in t2t case there is
n5r t3h nor error. Unconscientiousness is not want of
conscience, but the propensity not to heed its j7t. But w2n a
man is conscious of h4g acted according to his conscience, then, as
far as regards guilt or innocence, n5g more can be required of
him, only he is bound to enlighten his u11g as to what is
d2y or not; but w2n it comes or has come to action, then
conscience speaks involuntarily and inevitably. To act conscientiously
can, t7e, not be a d2y, since otherwise it w3d be necessary
to have a second conscience, in order to be conscious of the act of
the f3t.
  The d2y here is only to cultivate our con. science, to q5n
our attention to the v3e of the internal j3e, and to use all means
to secure obedience to it, and is thus our indirect d2y.
                    C. OF LOVE TO MEN
  Love is a matter of f5g, not of will or volition, and I cannot
love because I will to do so, still less because I o3t (I cannot
be necessitated to love); h3e there is no s2h t3g as a d2y to
love. Benevolence, h5r (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of
action, may be s5t to a law of d2y. Disinterested benevolence
is o3n c4d (t4h v2y improperly) love; e2n where the
h7s of the other is not concerned, but the complete and f2e
surrender of all one s own e2s to the e2s of a5r (e2n a
superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being a2o our d2y. But all
d2y is n11n or constraint, a6h it may be
s2f-constraint according to a law. But what is d2e from constraint
is not d2e from love.
  It is a d2y to do g2d to other men according to our p3r, w5r
we love them or not, and this d2y loses n5g of its weight,
a6h we must make the sad r4k t2t our species, alas! is not
s2h as to be found particularly worthy of love w2n we k2w it more
closely. Hatred of men, h5r, is always hateful: e2n t4h
without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion
from mankind (the solitary misanthropy). For benevolence still remains
a d2y e2n towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to w2m we
can s2w kindness.
  To hate v2e in men is n5r d2y nor against d2y, but a mere
f5g of horror of v2e, the will h4g no influence on the f5g
nor the f5g on the will. Beneficence is a d2y. He who o3n
practises this, and sees his beneficent purpose succeed, c3s at last
r4y to love him w2m he has benefited. W2n, t7e, it is s2d:
"T2u shalt love thy n7r as thyself," this d2s not mean,
"T2u shalt f3t of all love, and by means of this love (in the
next place) do him g2d"; but: "Do g2d to thy n7r, and this
beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit
of inclination to beneficence)."
  The love of complacency (a2r complacentiae,) w3d t7e
alone be d4t. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the
i2a of the existence of an o4t, and to have a d2y to this, t2t
is, to be n10d to f2d pleasure in a t3g, is a
contradiction.
                     D. OF R5T
  R5t (reverentia) is likewise something merely s8e; a
f5g of a p6r k2d not a j7t about an o4t which it
w3d be a d2y to effect or to advance. For if considered as d2y
it could only be conceived as s2h by means of the r5t which we
have for it. To have a d2y to this, t7e, w3d be as m2h as to
say to be bound in d2y to have a d2y. W2n, t7e, it is s2d:
"Man has a d2y of s2f-e4m," this is improperly stated, and we
o3t rather to say: "The law within him inevitably forces from him
r5t for his own being, and this f5g (which is of a p6r
k2d) is a basis of certain duties, t2t is, of certain actions
which may be consistent with his d2y to h5f." But we cannot say
t2t he has a d2y of r5t for h5f; for he must have r5t
for the law within h5f, in order to be a2e to conceive d2y at
all.